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[ 洋図書 ] Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit / ( The Princeton economic history of the Western world )

Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber. -- Princeton University Press, -- c2014. --

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ISBN 0691155240 (hbk. : acid-free paper)
ISBN13桁 9780691155241 (hardcover : alk. paper)
テキストの言語 英語                  
分類：NDC10版 338.2
個人著者標目 Calomiris, Charles W.
本タイトル Fragile by design :
タイトル関連情報 the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit /
著者名 Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber.
出版地・頒布地 Princeton :
出版者・頒布者名 Princeton University Press,
出版年・頒布年 c2014.
数量 xi, 570 p. :
他の形態的事項 ill. ;
大きさ 24 cm.
書誌注記 Includes bibliographical references (p. 507-548) and index.
内容注記 If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses.
要約、抄録、注釈等 "Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues." -- Publisher's description.
著者標目 Haber, Stephen H., 1957-
統一タイトル(シリーズ副出標目) Princeton economic history of the Western world.
シリーズ名・巻次 The Princeton economic history of the Western world 
一般件名 Banks and banking -- History.
Bank failures -- History.
資料情報1 『Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit /』（The Princeton economic history of the Western world）　Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber.　Princeton University Press,　c2014. （所蔵館：中央　 請求記号：F/338.2/C16/F　 資料コード：7105694545）
URL https://catalog.library.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/winj/opac/switch-detail.do?lang=ja&bibid=1352014970

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