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[ 洋図書 ] Seeing things as they are : a theory of perception /

John R. Searle. -- Oxford University Press, -- c2015. --

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中央 3階C 一般洋図書 F/141.2/S43/S 7107115042 配架図 Digital BookShelf
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ISBN 0199385157 (hardcover)
ISBN13桁 9780199385157 (hardcover)
テキストの言語 英語                  
分類：NDC10版 141.2
個人著者標目 Searle, John R.
本タイトル Seeing things as they are :
タイトル関連情報 a theory of perception /
著者名 John R. Searle.
出版地・頒布地 Oxford ;
出版者・頒布者名 Oxford University Press,
出版年・頒布年 c2015.
数量 xi, 240 pages, 4 unnumbered pages of plates :
他の形態的事項 illustrations (some color) ;
大きさ 22 cm
書誌注記 Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
内容注記 The bad argument : one of the biggest mistakes in philosophy in the past several centuries -- The intentionality of perceptual experiences -- Further developments of the argument against the bad argument -- How perceptual intentionality works, part one : basic features, causation, and intentional content -- How perceptual intentionality works, part two : extending the analysis to non-basic features -- Disjunctivism -- Unconscious perception -- Classical theories of perception skepticism and the classical theories of perception.
要約、抄録、注釈等 This book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. The central question concerns the relation between the subjective conscious perceptual field and the objective perceptual field. Everything in the objective field is either perceived or can be perceived. Nothing in the subjective field is perceivednor can be perceived precisely because the events in the subjective field consist of the perceivings, whether veridical or not, of the events in the objective field. Searle begins by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, what he calls the Bad Argument, as the source of nearly all of the confusions in the history of the philosophy of perception. He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. In the central theoretical chapters, he shows how it is possible that the raw phenomenology must necessarily determine certain form of intentionality. Searle introduces, in detail, the distinction between different levels of perception from the basic level to the higher levels and shows the internal relation between the features of the experience and the states of affairs presented by the experience. The account applies not just to language possessing human beings but to infants and conscious animals. He also discusses how the account relates to certain traditional puzzles about spectrum inversion, color and size constancy and the brain-in-the-vat thought experiments. In the final chapters he explains and refutes Disjunctivist theories of perception, explains the role of unconscious perception, and concludes by discussing traditional problems of perception such as skepticism.
一般件名 Perception (Philosophy)
Perception (Philosophy)
資料情報1 『Seeing things as they are : a theory of perception /』　John R. Searle.　Oxford University Press,　c2015. （所蔵館：中央　 請求記号：F/141.2/S43/S　 資料コード：7107115042）
URL https://catalog.library.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/winj/opac/switch-detail.do?lang=ja&bibid=1352019563

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