| ISBN |
0691163197 (hardcover)
|
| ISBN13桁 |
9780691163192 (hardcover)
|
| テキストの言語 |
英語
|
| 分類：NDC10版 |
338.253
|
| 個人著者標目 |
Binder, Sarah A.
|
| 本タイトル |
The myth of independence :
|
| タイトル関連情報 |
how Congress governs the Federal Reserve /
|
| 著者名 |
Sarah Binder, Mark Spindel.
|
| 出版地・頒布地 |
Princeton :
|
| 出版者・頒布者名 |
Princeton University Press,
|
| 出版年・頒布年 |
c2017.
|
| 数量 |
xv, 282 pages :
|
| 他の形態的事項 |
illustrations, maps ;
|
| 大きさ |
25 cm.
|
| 書誌注記 |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-273) and index.
|
| 内容注記 |
Monetary politics -- The blame game -- Creating the Federal Reserve -- Opening the act in the wake of the Depression -- Midcentury modern central banking -- The great inflation and the limits of independence -- The only game in town -- The myth of independence.
|
| 要約、抄録、注釈等 |
Born out of crisis a century ago, the Federal Reserve has become the most powerful macroeconomic policymaker and financial regulator in the world. The Myth of Independence traces the Fed's transformation from a weak, secretive, and decentralized institution in 1913 to a remarkably transparent central bank a century later. Offering a unique account of Congress's role in steering this evolution, Sarah Binder and Mark Spindel explore the Fed's past, present, and future and challenge the myth of its independence. Binder and Spindel argue that recurring cycles of crisis, blame, and reform propelled lawmakers to create and revamp the powers and governance of the Fed at critical junctures, including the Panic of 1907, the Great Depression, the postwar Treasury-Fed Accord, the inflationary episode of the 1907s, and the recent financial crisis. Marshaling archival sources, interviews, and statistical analyses, the authors pinpoint political and economic dynamics that shaped interactions between the legislature and the Fed, and that have generated a far stronger central bank than anticipated at its founding. The Fed today retains its unique federal style, diluting the ability of lawmakers and the president to completely centralize control of monetary policy. In the long wake of the financial crisis, with economic propsects decidedly subpar, partisan rivals in Congress seem poised to continue battling over the Fed's statutory mandates and the powers given to achieve them. Examining the interdependent relationship between America's Congress and its central bank, The Myth of Independence presents critical insights about the future of monetary and fiscal policies that drive the nation's economy. -- from dust jacket.
|
| 著者標目 |
Spindel, Mark,
1966-
|
| 団体件名 |
United States. -- Federal Reserve Board.
United States. -- Congress. |
| 一般件名 |
Federal Reserve banks.
Monetary policy -- United States. |
| 地名件名 |
United States -- Politics and government.
United States. |
| 資料情報1 |
『The myth of independence :
how Congress governs the Federal Reserve /』 Sarah Binder, Mark Spindel. Princeton University Press, c2017.
（所蔵館：中央
請求記号：F/338.2/B61/M
資料コード：7109715026）
|
| URL |
https://catalog.library.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/winj/opac/switch-detail.do?lang=ja&bibid=1352028388 |
