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[ 洋図書 ] Fixing democracy : why constitutional change often fails to enhance democracy in Latin America /

Javier Corrales. -- Oxford University Press, -- [2018], --

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ISBN 0190868899 (hardcover)
ISBN13桁 9780190868895 (hardcover)
無効なISBN等 9780190868918 (electronic book)
テキストの言語 英語                  
分類：NDC10版 312.55
個人著者標目 Corrales, Javier,
生没年等 1966-
本タイトル Fixing democracy :
タイトル関連情報 why constitutional change often fails to enhance democracy in Latin America /
著者名 Javier Corrales.
出版地・頒布地 New York, NY :
出版者・頒布者名 Oxford University Press,
出版年・頒布年 [2018],
数量 xi, 269 pages ;
大きさ 24 cm.
書誌注記 Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-258) and index.
内容注記 Introduction: Fixing Democracy -- Argument: Power Asymmetry, Constitutions, and Presidential Powers -- Origins: The Rise and Demise of Constituent Assemblies in Latin America -- Content: Constitutional Rewrites and Changes in Presidential Powers -- Venezuela: Extreme Variations in Power Asymmetry -- Bolivia: Natural Resources, Demographics, and Reduced Power Asymmetry -- Ecuador: When the Opposition Splits -- Changes to Term Limits: Self-Dealing, Power Asymmetry, and Ruling Parties -- Conclusion.
要約、抄録、注釈等 The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.-- Provided by Publisher.
一般件名 Executive power -- Latin America.
Constitutional history -- Latin America.
地名件名 Latin America -- Politics and government -- 1980-
Latin America.
資料情報1 『Fixing democracy : why constitutional change often fails to enhance democracy in Latin America /』　Javier Corrales.　Oxford University Press,　[2018], （所蔵館：中央　 請求記号：F/312.5/C82/F　 資料コード：7111752930）
URL https://catalog.library.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/winj/opac/switch-detail.do?lang=ja&bibid=1352037646

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